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Religion in Europe in the st Century:
The Factors to Take into Account*
T           combines two approaches. In the ﬁrst instance it
introduces the range of material that must be taken into account if the
religious situation in modern Europe is to be properly understood. As
part of the same enterprise, it will introduce the (primarily) sociological
literature that interrogates these data (). The later sections of the article
move in a diﬀerent direction: they open up at least some of the theore-
tical issues provoked by the European data. The link between the two
approaches can be found in Section : that is in the ways in which
Europe’s secular elites have reacted to the recent upsurge of religion in
public debate.
With this in mind, the article is structured as follows. Six very diﬀ-
erent factors will be considered, each in a diﬀerent section. These are:
- the legacies of the past, more particularly the role of the historic
churches in shaping European culture;
- an awareness that these churches still have a place at particular
moments in the lives of modern Europeans, even though they are no
longer able to discipline the beliefs and behavior of the great majority of
the population;
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This issue is entitled ‘‘After Secularization’’.
The present, considerably expanded version of
the article has beneﬁted greatly from the com-
ments of the editorial committee of AES/EJS
and from a more developed conversation with
Professor Hans Joas. I have been very grateful
for this feedback.
() This should not be thought of as a com-
prehensive review of the literature; it provides,
however, some strategic points of entry to a
growing, if uneven body of material on reli-
gion in this part of the world. As a start, useful
overviews of the place of religion in European
societies can be found in R´ (),
D (), G (), M and
E (), ML and U (),
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publications pertaining to particular societies.
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- an observable change in the church-going constituencies of the
continent, which operate increasingly on a model of choice, rather than a
model of obligation or duty;
- the arrival in Europe of groups of people from many diﬀerent parts
of the world, notably the global South, with very diﬀerent religious
aspirations from those seen in the host societies;
- the reactions of Europe’s secular elites to the increasing salience of
religion in public as well as private life; and
- a growing realization that the patterns of religious life in modern
Europe should be considered an ‘‘exceptional case’’ in global terms ¢
they are not a global prototype.
In the concluding remarks, an attempt will be made to assess the
relative weight of these diﬀerent inﬂuences, both now and in the
foreseeable future. What will the religious situation in Europe look like
in, say, the mid-st century? Is it possible to say? More precisely, will
Europe continue within the trajectory set by its past or will it become
more like the patterns found elsewhere in the world? Will the rest of the
world become more like Europe? The questions are straightforward
enough; the answers much more complex.
One further preliminary point is important: that is, to take note of the
unexpected prominence of religion in public debate in Europe in recent
decades, notably since . Examples abound. They include, selecti-
vely, ongoing controversies concerning the use of religious symbols in
the school systems of European societies, the disquiet in some countries
in relation to sects and new religious movements, the heated debate
about a reference to religion in the Preamble to the European Constitu-
tion (), and the discussions surrounding the possible accession of
Turkey to the European Union. Quite apart from the debates them-
selves, speciﬁc events have led to a noticeable rise in tension since the
turn of the millennium. Such events include the murders of Pim For-
tuyn and Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands (in  and  res-
pectively), the London bombings of July , the French car burnings
the same autumn, and a few months later explosive reactions to what
have become know as the ‘‘Danish cartoons’’. The summer of 
prompted further anxieties about acts of terrorism on passenger ﬂights.
A common thread can be found in all these illustrations: European
societies were ill-prepared for what was happening. Religion, it was
widely assumed, had been ‘‘dealt with’’ at an earlier stage in European
history and had become essentially a private matter. So why has religion
re-appeared both dramatically and publicly in recent decades at a
moment when the indices of religious activity in the historic churches





The starting point is less controversial. It concerns the undisputed
role of the historic churches in shaping European culture, bearing in
mind that other factors must also be retained. More precisely, O’Connell
() identiﬁes three formative factors or themes in the creation of the
unity that we call Europe: Judaeo-Christian monotheism, Greek ratio-
nalism, and Roman organization. These factors shift and evolve over
time, but their combinations can be seen in forming and reforming a way
of life that we have come to recognize as European. The religious strand
within such combinations is self-evident.
One example will suﬀice to illustrate this fact: the Christian tradition
has had an irreversible eﬀect on the shaping of time and space in this
part of the world. Both weeks and years, for instance, follow the Chris-
tian cycle, even if the major festivals are beginning to lose their reso-
nance for large sections of the population. Or to put the same point in a
diﬀerent way, we have had heated debates in parts of Europe about
whether or not to shop on Sundays. We do not, for the most part,
consider Friday an issue in this respect, though this may change. The
same is true of space. Wherever you look in Europe, there is a predo-
minance of Christian churches, some of which retain huge symbolic
value. This is not to deny that in some parts of Europe (notably the lar-
ger cities) the skyline is becoming an indicator of growing religious
diversity. Europe is evolving, but the legacies of the past remain deeply
embedded in both the physical and cultural environment.
The ambiguity of this situation can be seen in the debates surround-
ing the Preamble to the ill-fated European Constitution. Should it or
should it not contain a speciﬁc reference to Christianity? At one level, the
answer is simple enough. It all depends on what you think a preamble
should be. If a preamble is concerned with historical fact, then the
reference must be speciﬁc ¢ Christianity, amongst other things, has had a
huge and lasting inﬂuence in the formation of Europe. It is willful to
pretend otherwise. But if a preamble is an inspiration for the future, the
answers might well be diﬀerent ¢ or at least there are diﬀerent questions
to consider. Much of the confusion surrounding this controversial issue
lay in the fact that Europeans omitted to consider the precise nature of
the preamble that they were trying to write.
Given the failure of the French and Dutch publics to endorse the
Constitution, there has been a pause in the political debate. For the social
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scientist, there is no such respite: the underlying issues continue to assert
their presence. Two points are crucial in this respect. First the fact that
the debate took place at all is as signiﬁcant as its eventual outcome ¢ the
sociological paradigms dominant in the mid post-war decades (notably
what has become know as secularization theory) did not anticipate a
controversy such as this. Second the ‘‘patterns’’ that have emerged as
diﬀerent countries took diﬀerent positions on the reference to Christia-
nity in the Preamble demand our close attention ¢ new conﬁgurations
appeared as the countries that became part of the European Union in
May , most notably Poland, began to ﬂex their muscles. ‘‘Old
Europe’’ conversely was taken by surprise as the secular assumptions of
France in particular were seriously challenged. In this case, the secula-
rists ‘‘won’’, but the sharpness of the opposition came as something a
surprise (Schlesinger and Foret ).

The Historic Churches
Physical and cultural presence is one thing: a ‘‘hands-on’’ role in the
everyday lives of European people quite another. Commentators of all
kinds agree that, with very few exceptions, the latter is no longer a real-
istic aspiration for the historic churches of Europe. That does not mean,
however, that these institutions have entirely lost their signiﬁcance as
markers of religious identity. In my own work, I have explored these
continuing ambiguities in two ways: ﬁrst through the notion of ‘‘belie-
ving without belonging’’ (Davie ) and, second, through the concept
of ‘‘vicarious religion’’ (Davie ; ).
Believing Without Belonging
One of the most striking features of religious life in contemporary
Europe is the evident mismatch between diﬀerent measurements of
religiousness. There exists, ﬁrst of all, a set of indicators which measure
ﬁrm commitments to (a) institutional life, and (b) credal statements of
religion (in this case Christianity). All of these display a marked reduc-
tion in Europe as a whole, but most of all in the Protestant states of
Northern Europe ¢ hence the reputation of a country such as Sweden
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as one of the most secular in the world (). These indicators are, of
course, closely related to each other in so far as institutional commitment
(in the form of religious membership or regular practice) both reﬂects
and conﬁrms religious belief in its orthodox forms. The believing Chris-
tian attends church to express his or her belief and to receive aﬀirmation
that this is the right thing to do. At the same time, repeated exposure to
the institution and its teaching necessarily informs, not to say discipli-
nes, belief.
No observer of the current religious scene disputes these facts ¢ i.e.
that these dimensions of European religion are both interrelated and in
serious decline. There is, on the other hand, considerable debate about
the consequences of this situation. The complex relationship between
belief (in a wider sense) and practice is central to this discussion, for it is
clear that a manifest reduction in the ‘‘hard’’ indicators of religious life
has not, in the short term at least, had a similar eﬀect on rather less rigo-
rous dimensions of religiousness. Indeed, the resultant mismatch in the
diﬀerent indicators is the principal ﬁnding of the various enquiries car-
ried out under the auspices of the European Values Study (see note ); it
is supported by almost all empirical investigation of the current religious
scene in Northern Europe. It is precisely this state of aﬀairs, moreover,
which is captured by the phrase ‘‘believing without belonging’’ (Davie
), the popularity of which in both pastoral as well as sociological
accounts of religious life in modern Europe indicates, in itself, its per-
ceived accuracy.
Important questions follow from this, not all of which have been
underlined as ﬁrmly as they might. The ﬁrst concerns the status of the
churches as voluntary organizations. If it is true that the churches as
institutions have declined markedly in the post-war period, the same is
true of almost all parallel activities in the secular life of Northern
European (and indeed other) societies. The most obvious comparative
examples are political parties, trades unions and the wide range of lei-
sure activities which require ‘‘gathering’’ on a regular basis (). Situa-
ting the churches within this broader economic and social context is
crucial for a proper understanding of what is going on. It indicates that
the reduction in church activity in this part of Europe should be seen as
part of a profound change in the nature of social life; it is not, in contrast,
an unequivocal indicator of religious indiﬀerence. Or to put the same
() A reputation which is not entirely justi-
ﬁed (see the section in this chapter on vicarious
religion for a fuller discussion of this point).
() Such an argument mirrors Putnam’s
work on the United States (P ).
The situation in Europe is described in more
detail in D ().
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point more directly, believing without belonging is a pervasive dimen-
sion of modern European societies; it is not conﬁned to the religious
lives of European people.
A second point concerns the churches themselves. Understandably
enough, signiﬁcant numbers of those responsible for their maintenance
are attracted to the phrase ‘‘believing without belonging’’ in order to
justify their continued existence ¢ in other words things are not as bad as
they seem. As it happens, I do think that the churches have a continued
existence in Northern Europe, but for reasons that require careful and
detailed consideration (see below). In the meantime, it its important that
the churches’ personnel appreciate that the situation described by this
phrase is neither better nor worse than a more straightforwardly (if one
may use that term) secular society. It is simply diﬀerent. Those that
minister to a half-believing rather than unbelieving society will ﬁnd that
there are advantages and disadvantages to this situation, as there are in
any other. Working out appropriate theological and ministerial strategies
for this continually shifting and ill-deﬁned context is the central and
very demanding task of the religious professional. A ﬁrm and necessary
grasp of the sociological realities is but the starting point.
A third question relates to the remark made above concerning the
short and long term. It is, moreover, at this point that the sociological
debate intensiﬁes. There are those, for example (most notably Steve
Bruce) who argue cogently that the mismatch between believing and
belonging is simply a temporary phenomena; it is only a matter of time
before belief ¢ unsustained by belonging (i.e. by an institution) ¢
diminishes to match the more rigorous indicators of religiousness (see in
particular Bruce a; b). In so far as this debate refers to state-
ments of credal religion endorsed by the churches, I would entirely
agree with him. I am much less sure, however, about the looser and more
heterodox elements of belief. Indeed there are persuasive data emerging
from the most recent EVS enquiries, which indicate that the relationship
between certain dimensions of belief and belonging may well be inverse
rather than direct. Notable here are those aspects of belief which relate
to the soul and to life after death (Bréchon ; Lambert ). These
appear to rise markedly in younger rather than older generations, and in
precisely those countries of Europe (mostly but not exclusively in the
North) where the institutional capacities of the churches are most
diminished. More speciﬁcally Nordic data support these ﬁndings ();
they aﬀirm the relative conﬁdence among the young that there is some-




thing (not very speciﬁc) after death and that the tendency to believe in an
afterlife is increasing rather than decreasing. They also reveal the pre-
dilection of the young for an immanent rather than transcendent
understanding of God (i.e. a God in me).
Not everyone is convinced that this is so. If there are those who argue
that some aspects of the spirituality, if not the religion, of young people
shows signs of growth, there are others who emphasize an ever more
striking divorce between even the broadest deﬁnition of religion and
what has become know as ‘‘Generation Y’’ ¢ young people are simply
not interested in spiritual matters (Savage et alii ). The latter view is
supported by Voas and Crockett (), a more general article that
includes a helpful summary of the debate about belief without belon-
ging. Using largely quantitative sources, the authors conclude that the
British population neither believes nor belongs. Their ﬁndings, how-
ever, turn very largely on how the key terms are operationalized. Belief,
for example, can be taken to mean belief in a ‘‘personal God’’ or it can be
used more broadly. Interpretations diﬀer accordingly. Quite apart from
this, Voas and Crockett’s argument needs to be set against the ﬁndings of
the  United Kingdom Census which, somewhat unexpectedly,
revealed that just over % of the population in England and Wales
self-identiﬁed as Christian. But what, precisely, were these self-
identifying Christians thinking about when they ticked a box labeled
‘‘Christian’’? Were they claiming to be Christian and not secular, or were
they claiming to be Christian and not Muslim? That is not at all
clear ().
What is clear, however, is the need to take into account the connec-
tions between emergent patterns of belief and the institutional churches
themselves, bearing in mind that the latter not only exist but continue to
exert an inﬂuence on many aspects of individual and collective lives ¢
even in Europe. The notion of ‘‘vicarious religion’’ is central to this
discussion.
Vicarious Religion
By vicarious, I mean the notion of religion performed by an active
minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least)
not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the minority is doing
() A start has been made on this important
question in a recent Ph D thesis (see D
). More general discussions of the reli-
gious questions in the  Census can be
found in V and B () and W
().
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(Davie ; ) (). The ﬁrst half of the deﬁnition is relatively
straightforward and reﬂects the everyday meaning of the term ¢ that is,
to do something on behalf of someone else (hence the word ‘‘vicar’’).
The second half is more controversial and is best explored by means of
examples. Religion, it seems, can operate vicariously in a wide variety of
ways: churches and church leaders perform rituals on behalf of others;
church leaders and churchgoers believe on behalf of others; church
leaders and churchgoers embody moral codes on behalf of others;
churches, ﬁnally, can oﬀer space for the vicarious debate of unresolved
issues in modern societies. Each of these propositions will be taken in
turn in order to demonstrate the fruitfulness of looking at European
religion from this point of view.
The least controversial of the above list concerns the role of both
churches and church leaders in conducting ritual on behalf of a wide
variety of individuals and communities at critical points in their lives.
The most obvious examples can be found in the continuing requests,
even in a moderately secular society, for some sort of religious ritual at
the time of a birth, a marriage, and, most of all, a death. In many parts of
Europe, though not in all (the regional dimensions are important), the
demand for the ﬁrst two of these diminished sharply in the later decades
of the th century. The same is not true with respect to churches’ ser-
vices at the time of a death. It is at this point, if no other, that most
Europeans come into direct contact with their churches and would be
deeply oﬀended if their requests for a funeral were met with a rejection.
A refusal to oﬀer either a funeral liturgy or appropriate pastoral care
would violate deeply held assumptions.
Exactly the same point can be made the other way round. It is per-
fectly possible to have a secular ceremony at the time of a death; de facto,
however, relatively few people do this. Much more common is what
might be termed a ‘‘mixed economy’’ funeral ¢ that is, a liturgy in which
the religious professional is present and the Christian structure
maintained but ﬁlled with a variety of extraneous elements, including
secular music or readings and, with increasing frequency, a eulogy rather
than a homily. Princess Diana’s funeral in September  oﬀers an
excellent illustration (Davie and Martin ) (). Churches, moreover,
() D () oﬀers a developed discus-
sion of vicarious religion from two perspecti-
ves: substantive and methodological. Not only
does it extend the list of examples outlined in
this article, it suggests ways in which this elu-
sive phenomenon can be grasped by the social
scientiﬁc observer. It demands innovative
forms of sociological method. This discussion
is continued in D ().
() François Mitterrand oﬀers a more sur-
prising example. Here surely was an individual
who ‘‘merited’’ a secular funeral. The fact that
he chose, or appears to have chosen, not one
mass, but two, in the most strikingly secular
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maintain vicariously the rituals from which a larger population can draw
when the occasion demands it, and whilst that population clearly anti-
cipates a certain freedom in ritual expression, they also expect the ins-
titutional structures to be kept ﬁrmly in place. This is the essence of
vicarious religion.
But churches and church leaders do more than conduct rituals: they
also believe on behalf of others. And the more senior or visible the role
of the church leader, the more important it becomes that this is done
properly. English bishops, to give but one example, are rebuked (not
least by the tabloid press) if they doubt in public; it is, after all, their
‘‘job’’ to believe. The most celebrated, and not entirely justiﬁed case of a
‘‘doubting bishop’’ in the Church of England was that of David Jenkins,
Bishop of Durham from  to  (). To a large extent the
controversy turned on a frequently misquoted statement concerning the
Resurrection. The phrase ‘‘not just a conjuring trick with bones’’ quickly
turned into the opposite, for which the Bishop was widely pilloried ¢
and in the secular as well as the religious press. Nor was he allowed to
forget this mistake. The expectation, in other words, is that bishops
believe; when they doubt, cultural as well as theological expectations are
violated.
Similar pressures emerge with respect to behavioral codes: religious
professionals (both local and national) are expected to uphold certain
standards of behavior ¢ notably more rather than less traditional
representations of family life and incur criticism when they fail, from
outside churches as well as within. It is almost as if people who are not
themselves participants in church life want the church’s representatives
to embody a certain social and moral order, thereby maintaining a way of
living that has long since ceased to be the norm in the population as a
whole. Failure leads to accusations of hypocrisy but also to expressions
of disappointment. (Interestingly royal divorces provoke a similar
reaction.) Such expectations become at times unreasonable, particularly
in relation to the partners and children of religious personnel; it is hardly
surprising that clergy families come under strain. The pressures on the
Catholic priest are somewhat diﬀerent, given the requirement of celi-
bacy, but in their own way they are equally demanding ().
country in Europe, should not be taken for
granted (H-Lé a).
() Shortly after David Jenkins’ consecra-
tion in York Minster, the building was struck
by lightning, an event that was seen by some as
a sign of divine displeasure. This episode was
given extensive press coverage at the time (July
). See also David J’ own account
().
() It is for this reason that scandals
concerning the sexual abuse of children pro-
voke the strongest possible reactions. Priests of
all people should not abuse the trust placed in
them.
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A ﬁnal possibility with respect to vicariousness develops this point
further, and more provocatively. Could it be that churches oﬀer space for
debate regarding particular, and often controversial, topics that are dif-
ficult to address elsewhere in society? The current controversy concer-
ning homosexuality in the Church of England oﬀers a possible example,
an interpretation encouraged by the intense media attention directed at
this issue ¢ and not only in Britain. Is this simply an internal debate
about senior clergy appointments in which diﬀerent lobbies within the
church are exerting pressure? Or is this one way in which society as a
whole comes to terms with profound shifts in the moral climate? If the
latter is not true, it is hard to understand why so much attention is being
paid to the churches in this respect. If it is true, sociological thinking
must take this factor into account. Either way, large sections of the
European media are, it seems, wanting to have their cake and eat it,
pointing the spotlight at controversies within the church whilst main-
taining that religious institutions must, by their very nature, be marginal
to modern society.
Social science cannot aﬀord a similar mistake. The public attention
displayed in the examples set out above demands that we understand
how religious institutions matter even to those who are not ‘‘partici-
pants’’ in them (in the conventional sense of the term). That, moreover,
is the norm in European societies ¢ a situation rather diﬀerent from that
found in the United States. Indeed, in a decade of lecturing across both
Europe and the United States, I have seldom met an audience in the
former that does not immediately grasp the notion of vicariousness and
its implications for the European scene. This is much less the case in the
United States, where the connections between the population and their
religious organizations are very diﬀerently understood. There are
exceptions, but to act vicariously is not on the whole a part of American
self-understanding (Davie, ).
Herein, moreover, lies an important explanation for the particular
nature of European forms of religion. Such forms derive from a history
of state-church relationships, out of which grows the notion of a state
church (or its successor) as a public utility rather than a private organi-
zation. A public utility is available to the population as a whole at the
point of need and is funded through the tax system. Precisely that
combination remains in place in the Lutheran countries of Europe.
Elsewhere both constitutional and ﬁnancial arrangements have been
modiﬁed (sometimes radically), but the associated mentalities are more
diﬀicult to shift. In the United States in contrast, the notion of a reli-
gious market composed of competing religious ﬁrms not only exists, but
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has generated a diﬀerent sociological paradigm ¢ the application of
rational choice theory to religion (). Indeed, rational choice theory is
to America what secularization theory is to Europe ¢ a discussion
beyond the scope of this article, but developed in some detail in Davie
().

From Obligation to Consumption
The contrast with the United States is important, but so too is the
changing nature of churchgoing in modern Europe ¢ taking care to
clarify the constituency. Here are Europe’s diminishing, but still signi-
ﬁcant churchgoers ¢ those who maintain the tradition on behalf of the
people described in the previous section. And here an observable, pos-
sibly American-style, change is clearly taking place, best summarized as
a shift from a culture of obligation or duty to a culture of consumption
or choice. What was once simply imposed (with all the negative conno-
tations of this word), or inherited (a rather more positive spin), becomes
instead a matter of personal choice: ‘‘I go to church (or to another reli-
gious organization) because I want to, maybe for a short period or maybe
for longer, to fulﬁll a particular rather than a general need in my life and
where I will continue my attachment so long as it provides what I want,
but I have no obligation either to attend in the ﬁrst place or to continue if
I don’t want to’’.
Two points are immediately important. The ﬁrst concerns the nature
of these choices. These are not necessarily shallow or self-indulgent.
More often than not, they indicate ﬁrmly held convictions with public as
well as private implications ¢ they must be taken seriously. The second
relates the material in this section to the one that preceded it: choice is
entirely compatible with vicariousness ¢ more precisely ‘‘the churches
need to be there in order that I may attend them if I so choose’’. The
‘‘chemistry’’, however, gradually alters, a shift that is discernible in both
practice and belief, not to mention the connections between them. There
is, for example, an easily documentable change in the patterns of
conﬁrmation in the Church of England. The overall number of conﬁr-
mations has dropped dramatically in the post-war period, evidence once
() Y () oﬀers a useful introduc-
tion both to the paradigm itself and to the
controversies that this has generated. The
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
(since the mid s) has become a focus for
this particular, and continuing, debate.
   

again of institutional decline. In England, though not yet in the Nordic
countries, conﬁrmation is no longer a teenage rite of passage, but a
relatively rare event undertaken as a matter of personal choice by people
of all ages. Indeed, there is a very marked rise in the proportion of adult
conﬁrmations among the candidates overall ¢ up to % by the mid-
s (by no means enough, however, to oﬀset the fall among teenagers).
Conﬁrmation becomes, therefore, a very signiﬁcant event for those
individuals who choose this option, an attitude that is bound to aﬀect the
rite itself ¢ which now includes the space for a public declaration of
faith. Conﬁrmation becomes, in fact, an opportunity to make public
what has often been an entirely private activity. It is increasingly com-
mon, moreover, to baptize an adult candidate immediately before the
conﬁrmation, a gesture which is evidence in itself of the fall in infant
baptism some twenty to thirty years earlier. Taken together, these events
indicate a marked change in the nature of membership in the historic
churches, which become, in some senses, much more like their non-
established counterparts. Voluntarism (a market) is beginning to esta-
blish itself de facto, regardless of the constitutional position of the
churches. Or to continue the ‘‘chemical’’ analogy a little further, a whole
set of new reactions are set oﬀ that in the longer term (the stress is
important) may have a profound eﬀect on the understanding of vica-
riousness.
The trends are considerably more visible in some parts of Europe
than in others. There is, for instance, a marked parallel between the
Anglicans and the Catholic Church in France in this respect: adult
baptisms in the Church of England match very closely those in France ¢
indeed, the similarity in the statistics is almost uncanny, given the very
diﬀerent ecclesiologies embodied in the two churches, one Catholic and
one Protestant (Davie , pp. -). But it is precisely this shift across
very diﬀerent denominations that encourages the notion that something
profound is taking place. Lutheran nations, however ¢ despite their
reputation for being the most secular countries in Europe ¢ still adhere
to a more traditional pattern as far as conﬁrmation is concerned, though
the manner is which they do this is changing. Large numbers of young
people now choose the option of a conﬁrmation camp rather than a series
of weekly meetings (). In making this choice, conﬁrmation becomes
an ‘‘experience’’ in addition to a rite of passage, implying a better ﬁt with
other aspects of youth culture.
() Interestingly, the ﬁgures for conﬁrmation remain particularly high in Finland.
 
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The stress on experience is important in other ways as well. It can be
seen in the choices that the religiously active appear to be making, at least
in the British case. Here, within a constituency that is evidently reduced,
two options stand out as disproportionately popular. The ﬁrst is the
conservative evangelical church ¢ the success story of late th century
church ¢ going, both inside and outside the mainstream. These are chur-
ches that draw their members from a relatively wide geographical area
and work on a congregational, rather than parish, model. Individuals are
invited to opt in rather than opt out, and membership implies commit-
ment to a set of speciﬁed beliefs and behavioral codes. For signiﬁcant
numbers of people, these churches oﬀer ﬁrm boundaries, clear guidance,
and considerable support ¢ eﬀective protection from the vicissitudes of
life. Interestingly, however, it is the softer charismatic forms of evange-
licalism that are doing particularly well; old-fashioned Biblicism, rela-
tively speaking, is losing its appeal (Heelas and Woodhead ).
Very diﬀerent and less frequently recognized in the writing about
religion in modern Britain (as indeed in Europe) is the evident popula-
rity of cathedrals and city-center churches (). Cathedrals and their
equivalents deal with diverse constituencies. Working from the inside
out, they are frequented by regular and irregular worshippers, pilgrims,
visitors, and tourists, though the lines between these groups frequently
blur. The numbers, moreover, are considerable ¢ the more so on special
occasions, both civic and religious. Hence, concerns about upkeep and
facilities lead to diﬀicult debates about ﬁnance. Looked at from the point
of view of consumption, however, cathedrals are places that oﬀer a dis-
tinctive product: traditional liturgy, top-class music, and excellence in
preaching, all of which take place in an historic and often very beautiful
building. A visit to a cathedral is an aesthetic experience, sought after by
a wide variety of people, including those for whom membership or
commitment present diﬀiculties. They are places where there is no
obligation to opt in or to participate in communal activities beyond the
service itself. In this respect, they become almost the mirror image of
the evangelical churches already described.
The relative popularity of cathedrals is closely linked to a further
feature of religion in modern Europe: that is the growing numbers of
people, of all ages, who are choosing to take part in pilgrimages. The
evidence is clear: pilgrimage sites right across Europe report an upturn
in interest whether they be medieval in origin (Santiago de Compostela),
Marian shrines (such as Lourdes or Medjugurje), or more modern
places of gathering (Taizé or Iona). Sociological work proliferates
() P () is a welcome exception.
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accordingly, as observers try to come to terms with the popularity of
these one-oﬀ, evidently special occasions alongside the continuing
decline in regular attendance (). The massive gathering of the faithful
in Rome for the funeral of John Paul II in April  should be seen in a
similar light. If it was clear all along that the death of this remarkable
man would be a moment of considerable signiﬁcance, the scale of the
reaction took everyone by surprise. World leaders, including three US
Presidents, knew that they had to be present, making this essentially
religious event the largest gathering of states people in world history;
domestic priorities (including in Britain a royal wedding) were simply
set aside.
What then is the common feature in these very diﬀerent stories? It is,
it seems, the experiential or ‘‘feel-good’’ factor, whether this be
expressed in charismatic worship, in a special cathedral occasion (a
candlelit carol service or a major civic event), or in a gathering of large
numbers of people to mark a signiﬁcant occasion. The point is that we
feel something; we experience the sacred, the set apart. The purely cere-
bral is less appealing. Durkheim was entirely correct in this respect: it is
the taking part that matters for late modern populations and the feelings
so engendered. Such a statement has an important methodological
corollary. In order to understand the complexities of these data, we need
appropriate sociological tools ¢ notably those that can deal both with the
mobilities of religious life in modern Europe and with its emergent
forms. No longer is it possible simply to place individuals into boxes of
those who ‘‘practise’’ and those who do not, given that the great majority
of European people lie somewhere between the two. Hence the value of
Hervieu-Léger’s innovative ideal types, the ‘‘convert’’ and the ‘‘pilgrim’’
(b). Both indicate movement: the former is associated with the
decision to join a more demanding congregation; the latter with the
seeking and searching of the less convinced ().
() H (), C and E
(; ), and C and E ()
oﬀer interesting, though very diﬀerent, exam-
ples. Harris’ work on Lourdes is primarily
historical, though her approach is innovative.
Coleman and Eisner demonstrate the truly
global nature of this phenomenon. Individual,
rather more popular, accounts of the pilgri-
mage to Santiago de Compostela are now
commonplace.
() Hervieu-Léger has written a ‘‘trilogy’’
of books on diﬀerent aspects of religion in
modern Europe, paying particular attention to
the French case (H-L´ b, 






The fourth factor in this complicated mosaic is somewhat diﬀerent: it
concerns the growing number of incomers in almost all European
societies. There have been two stages in this process. The ﬁrst was
closely linked to the urgent need for labour in the expanding economies
of post-war Europe ¢ notably in Britain, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands. Wherever possible, each of these countries looked to its
former empire to expand its workforce: Britain to the West Indies and
the Indian sub-continent, France to the Mahgreb, Germany (with no
empire) to Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands to its
overseas connections (Indonesia and Surinam), but also to Morocco.
The second wave of immigration occurred in the s and included, in
addition to the places listed above, both the Nordic countries and the
countries of Mediterranean Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portu-
gal) ¢ bearing in mind that the latter, until very recently, have been ¢
countries of emigration rather than immigration. The turnaround in
some of these has been truly remarkable, one of the sharpest of all being
the transformation in the s of Dublin, Ireland, from a relatively
poor city to a thriving, expensive, and increasingly diverse place to
live ().
Diﬀerent host societies and diﬀerent countries of provenance have
led to a complex picture ¢ generalization is dangerous. Some points,
however, are common to most, if not all, cases. First and foremost, those
who are arriving in Europe are coming primarily for economic reasons ¢
in other words they are coming to work. If the ﬁrst wave provided labour
for expanding industrial economies, the second ﬁlled a rather diﬀerent
gap. As the th century drew to a close, Europeans were becoming
increasingly aware that there were insuﬀicient numbers in employment
in Europe to support the rising proportion of dependent people ¢
notably the growing number of the retired. The pull factor in this case is
the shifting demographic proﬁle. A second point follows from this: all is
well, or relatively well, as long as there is suﬀicient work for everyone in
an economy able to maintain the services necessary for incoming popu-
lations. All is less well when there is a downturn in the economy (as
happened in the late s and s) or when those who work to support
() In terms of its religious life, Ireland is
in many respects a ‘‘Mediterranean’’ country.
It is also very like Poland, in so far as Catholi-
cism has become a marker of national identity.
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dependent Europeans become dependent themselves. Hence the unrest
in France in the autumn of : a population excluded both from the
economy itself, and from its concomitant beneﬁts, expressed its frustra-
tion on the streets.
What, though, are the implications for the religious life of Europe?
The short answer is that they vary from place to place depending on
both host society and new arrivals. Britain and France oﬀer an instruc-
tive comparison. In Britain immigration has been much more varied
than in France, both in terms of provenance and in terms of faith com-
munities. West Indians, for example, are Christians ¢ and much more
formed in their Christianity than their British equivalents. One result of
this is the vibrant Afro-Caribbean churches of Britain’s larger cities ¢
some of the most active Christian communities in the country ().
From the sub-continent, moreover, come Sikhs and Hindus as well as a
sizeable number of Muslims (. million). Britain is also a country
where ethnicity and religion criss-cross each other in a bewildering
variety of ways (only Sikhs and Jews claim ethno-religious identities).
The situation in France is very diﬀerent: here immigration has been
largely from the Maghreb, as a result of which France has by far the
largest Muslim community in Europe (between  and  million) ¢ an
almost entirely Arab population. Rightly or wrongly, Arab and Muslim
have become interchangeable terms in popular parlance in France.
Britain and France can be compared in other ways as well ¢ an
exercise that provokes some interesting questions, among them the ten-
sions between democracy and tolerance. France, for example, is mark-
edly more democratic than Britain on almost all institutional or consti-
tutional measures. France is a Republic, with a secular state, two elected
chambers, and no privileged church (in the sense of connections to the
state). There is a correspondingly strong stress on the equality of all
citizens whatever their ethnic or religious identity. As a result, France
follows a strongly assimilationist policy towards incomers, with the
express intention of eradicating diﬀerence ¢ individuals who arrive in
France are welcome to maintain their religious belief and practices,
provided these are relegated to the private sphere. They are actively
discouraged from developing any kind of group identity. Exactly the
same point can be put as follows: any loyalty (religious or otherwise) that
comes between the citizen and the state in France is regarded in negative
terms. The result, whether intended or not, is a relative lack of tolerance,
() There is a negative side to this story.
For a variety of reasons, among them racism,
Afro-Caribbeans were largely excluded from
mainstream churches when they ﬁrst arrived in
Britain, an episode that the historic churches
have come to regret bitterly.
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if by tolerance is meant the freedom to promote collective as well as
individual expressions of religious identity ¢ that is, those expressions
that impact the public as well as the private sphere.
Britain is very diﬀerent. On a strict measure of democracy, Britain
fares less well than France ¢ with no written constitution, a monarchy, a
half-reformed and so far unelected House of Lords, and an established
church. More positively, Britain has a more developed tradition of
accommodating group identities (including religious ones) within the
framework of British society, a feature that owes a great deal to the
relatively greater degree of religious pluralism that has existed in Britain
for centuries rather than decades. Hence a markedly diﬀerent policy
towards newcomers: the goal becomes the accommodation of diﬀerence
rather than its eradication. Rather more provocative, however, are the
conclusions that emerge if you look carefully at who, precisely, in British
society is advocating religious as opposed to ethnic toleration. Very fre-
quently it turns out to be those in society who do not depend on an
electoral mandate: the royal family, signiﬁcant spokespersons in the
House of Lords (where other faith communities are well represented by
appointment, not by election), and prominent members of the esta-
blished Church. The latter, in fact, become the protectors of ‘‘faith’’ in
general rather than the protectors of speciﬁcally English expressions of
Christianity ().
Beneath these examples, lies however a common factor: the growing
presence of other faith communities in general, and of the Muslim
population in particular, is challenging some deeply held European
assumptions. The notion that faith is a private matter and should, there-
fore, be proscribed from public life ¢ notably from the state and from the
education system ¢ is widespread in Europe (not only in France).
Conversely, many of those who are currently arriving in this part of the
world have markedly diﬀerent convictions, and oﬀer ¢ simply by their
presence ¢ a challenge to the European way of doing things. Reactions to
this challenge vary from place to place, but at the very least, European
societies have been obliged to re-open debates about the place of religion
in public as well as private life ¢ hence the heated controversies about
the Preamble to the Constitution, about wearing the veil in the school
system, about the rights or wrongs of publishing material that one faith
community in particular ﬁnds oﬀensive, and about the location of
‘‘non-European’’ religious buildings. There have been moments,
moreover, when a lack of mutual comprehension, together with an
() For a more detailed presentation of this argument, including a discussion of the Dutch
case, see D (forthcoming).
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unwillingness to compromise on many of these issues, have led alarm-
ingly fast to dangerous confrontations, both in Europe and beyond.
Hence a huge and growing literature, indicative of alarm as well as
interest in this ﬁeld ().

Europe’s Secular Elites
Such episodes raise a further point which, if developed, could
become an article in its own right. That is the extent to which the secular
elites of Europe use these events in order to articulate alternatives ¢
ideological, constitutional and institutional ¢ to religion. In the relati-
vely limited space that remains in this paper, this question will be
approached in two ways. First by emphasizing that such elites, just like
their religious alter-egos, vary markedly from place to place, a discussion
that mirrors elements of the previous sections. The second is rather
diﬀerent and draws from the recent, primarily philosophical, analyses of
Jürgen Habermas () concerning the place of religion in the public
sphere; it is an argument developed in global as well as European terms.
A useful point of departure can be found in the contrast already
established between Britain and France. Key in this respect is an aware-
ness that the process of secularization has taken place diﬀerently in the
two countries (Martin ). What in Britain, and indeed in most of
Northern Europe, occurred gradually (starting with a de-clericalization
of the churches from within at the time of Reformation), became in
France a delayed and much more ideological clash between a hegemonic,
heavily clerical church and a much more militant secular state. Hence ‘‘la
guerre des deux Frances’’ (Poulat ) (), which dominated French
political life well into the th century. The legacies still remain in the
form of a self-consciously secular elite, and a lingering suspicion
concerning religion of all kinds ¢ the more so when this threatens the
public sphere. The fact that these threats are no longer Catholic but
() N () contains an extensive
and very useful bibliographic essay on Islam in
Europe. More recent references include F-
 and S (), C (), C
and ML (), and K
().
() ‘‘The war of two Frances’’ ¢ i.e. one
secular and one Catholic, each of which is the
mirror image of the other. An interesting
question follows from this: as Catholic culture
in France gradually collapses, will its secular
alter-ego follow suit? Exactly that happened in
Italy, only the other way round. When the
Communist Party imploded after ,
Christian Democracy could no longer sustain
itself as a viable political force.
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Muslim does not alter the underlying reaction. Hence the policies set out
in the previous section, which can be contrasted with the British case. In
the latter, something rather diﬀerent occurs: overlapping elites (both
religious and secular) work together to encourage mutual respect
between diﬀerent world faiths, a policy admirably illustrated following
the bombings in London in July  ().
Exactly the same issue can be approached from the other side ¢ this
time by interrogating the diﬀerent formulations of the Enlightenment
that are found not only in diﬀerent parts of Europe, but (more radically)
in the contrast between Europe and the United States. France, for
example, is the European society in which the Enlightenment has been
most obviously conﬁgured as a freedom from belief, an attitude which
ﬁnds expression in the democratic, though not always very tolerant,
arrangements already described and in an attitude in which religion is
ﬁrmly relegated to the private sphere. The French Enlightenment,
moreover, is carried in institutions which are central to the lives of every
French citizen: the state and the school system. The state assumes moral
as well as organization qualities; the school system both embodies and
teaches the quintessentially French notion of laïcité (). In the United
States, the Enlightenment became something very diﬀerent: not a free-
dom from belief, but a freedom to believe ¢ an understanding embedded
in the American Revolution which worked through religion rather than
against this. Hence a strikingly diﬀerent outcome on the other side of the
Atlantic in which vibrant forms of religion grow alongside a developing
democracy, both of which interact positively with economic change.
Religion moved easily into the industrial cities of North America.
In Europe rapid urbanization at the time of the industrial revolution
undermined the much more static, territorially-based forms of religion,
themselves threatened by a more aggressive Enlightenment. But if the
erosion of the historic, parish-based churches was common to the
continent as a whole, the Enlightenment itself was diﬀerently cons-
tructed. In much of Northern Europe, Germany and Italy ¢ to take
three very diﬀerent examples ¢ important epistemological shifts were
worked out as much through the dominant religious tradition as against
this. Scottish Calvinism, German Pietism and Italian Catholicism were
() The point was well-covered in the
press following this episode. It has also been
noted at European level. See the Report of the
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia (EUMC ). It is equally clear
that the renewed anxieties of August  put
these partnerships under some strain.
() Both the term laïcité itself and the idea
behind it are diﬀicult to convey in English.
Laïcité means the absence of religion from the
public sphere — notably the state and the
school system. This absence is not simply a
negative; it is underpinned by a distinctive,
coherent and at times confrontational ideology.
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not simply an opposition to progress ¢ they were part and parcel of the
changes taking place, attitudes which can be still be seen in modern
debate. Himmelfarb (), for example, is indicative of a growing, and
at times controversial, literature in which the French Enlightenment
becomes the exception rather than the rule. The British case is particu-
larly interesting in this respect. It is pulled in one direction by its insti-
tutions (notably a state church model of religious organization), and in
another by its philosophical ideals. Hence two rather diﬀerent outcomes:
on the one hand, the decline in the historic churches of Britain is entirely
in line with its European neighbours; on the other, relatively high levels
of religious toleration resonate more with the American case.
Habermas () considers the role of the secular, post-
Enlightenment citizen from a diﬀerent point of view, taking as his startt-
ing point the increasing signiﬁcance of religious traditions and com-
munities in much of the modern world (Berger , Jenkins P. ).
In light of these clearly unexpected changes, Habermas addresses the
debate in terms of John Rawls’ celebrated concept, the ‘‘public use of
reason’’ (p. ). The challenge which emerges is provocative: Habermas
invites of secular citizens, including Europeans, ‘‘a self-reﬂective trans-
cending of the secularist self-understanding of Modernity’’ (p. ) ¢ an
attitude that quite clearly goes beyond ‘‘mere tolerance’’ in that it
necessary engenders feelings of respect for the worldview of the reli-
gious person. There is in fact a growing reciprocity in the argument.
Historically, religious citizens had to adapt to an increasingly secular
environment in order to survive at all. Secular citizens were better pla-
ced in that they avoided, almost by deﬁnition, ‘‘cognitive dissonances’’
in the modern secular state. This however may not be the case for much
longer as religion and religious issues increasingly pervade the agenda.
Hence an additional question. Are these issues simply to be regarded as
relics of a pre-modern era, or is it the duty of the more secular citizen to
overcome his or her narrowly secularist consciousness in order to engage
with religion in terms of ‘‘reasonably expected disagreement″ (p. ),
assuming in other words a degree of rationality on both sides? The latter
appears to be the case. Habermas’ argument is challenging in every sense
of the term and merits very careful reﬂection; it constitutes an interes-
ting response to a changing global environment ¢ one moreover in which
the relative secularity of Europe is increasingly seen as an exceptional,




Europe: an Exceptional Case
More precisely, in the initial pages of Habermas’ article, two closely
linked ideas are introduced: on the one had the increasing isolation of
Europe from the rest of the world in terms of its religious conﬁgura-
tions, and on the other the notion of ‘‘multiple modernities’’. It was
exactly this combination that I developed in some detail in Europe: The
Exceptional Case (Davie ). The starting point lies in reversing the
‘‘normal’’ question: instead of asking what Europe is in term of its reli-
gious existence, it asks what Europe is not. It is not (yet) a vibrant reli-
gious market such as that found in the United States; it is not a part of
the world where Christianity is growing exponentially, very often in
Pentecostal forms, as in the case in the Southern hemisphere (Latin
America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Paciﬁc Rim); it is not a part of the
world dominated by faiths other than Christianity, but is increasingly
penetrated by these; and it is not for the most part subject to the violence
often associated with religion and religious diﬀerence in other parts of
the globe ¢ the more so if religion becomes entangled in political conﬂict.
Hence the inevitable, if at times disturbing conclusion: that the patterns
of religion in modern Europe, notably its relative secularity, might be an
exceptional case in global terms (Berger ).
Precisely that fact has become a central feature of the debate about
multiple modernities, a theoretical construct that draws heavily on the
work of Shmuel Eisenstadt (). The negative aspects of this debate
are unequivocally set out in the following paragraph:
The notion of ‘‘multiple modernities’’ denotes a certain view of the contemporary
world ¢ indeed of the history and characteristics of the modern era ¢ that goes
against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourse. It goes against
the view of the ‘‘classical’’ theories of modernization and of the convergence of
industrial societies prevalent in the s, and indeed against the classical socio-
logical analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least
in one reading of his work. They all assumed, even only implicitly, that the cultural
program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institu-
tional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all moder-
nizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail
throughout the world. (Eisenstadt , p. )
Right from the start, therefore, Eisenstadt challenges both the
assumption that modernizing societies are convergent, and the notion of
Europe (or indeed anywhere else) as the lead society in the modernizing
process.
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How then does the multiple modernities approach develop from a
positive point of view? In the introductory essay to the set of compara-
tive cases, Eisenstadt suggests that the best way to understand the
modern world (in other words to grasp the history and nature of
modernity) is to see this as ‘‘a story of continual constitution and
reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs’’ (, p. ). A
second point follows from this. These on-going reconstitutions do not
drop from the sky; they emerge as the result of endless encounters on the
part of both individuals and groups, all of whom engage in the creation
(and recreation) of both cultural and institutional formations, but within
different economic and cultural contexts. Once this way of thinking is
ﬁrmly in place it becomes easier to appreciate one of the fundamental
paradoxes of Eisenstadt’s writing: namely that to engage with the Wes-
tern understanding of modernity, or even to oppose it, is an indisputably
modern as to embrace it. It is equally clear that the form of modernity
that has emerged in Europe is only one among many; it is not necessarily
the global prototype.
Such a statement is crucial with respect to religion. It goes straight to
the heart of an urgent and as yet unresolved theoretical discussion nicely
captured in the following question: is secularization intrinsic or extrinsic
to the modernization process? In other words is Europe secular because it
is modern (or at least more modern than other parts of the world), or is it
secular, because it is European, and has developed along a distinctive
pathway unlikely to be repeated elsewhere? Central to this discussion is
the notion of a ‘‘lead society’’ and if so, which one ¢ Europe or the
United States (or neither)? Equally signiﬁcant is the fact that the domi-
nant lines of thinking in modern social science ¢ including thinking
about religion ¢ emerge from the European, more particularly French,
Enlightenment. And if the European case turns out to be exceptional
rather than typical, where should we look for conceptual tools to
understand better what is happening in the rest of the world? The
theoretical implications of these debates are huge and as such lie beyond
the scope of this article (), which ¢ within this considerably enlarged
framework (theoretical as well as geographical) ¢ must now re-focus not
only on the European case itself, but on its possible futures.




Several things are happening simultaneously in the religious life of
Europe. The fact that they are occurring at the same time is partly a
coincidence ¢ each, however, encourages the other. The historic chur-
ches, despite their continuing presence, are quite clearly losing their
capacity to discipline the religious thinking of large sections of the
population (especially among the young). Simultaneously, the range of
religious choice is widening all the time both inside and outside the
historic churches. New forms of religion are coming into Europe from
outside, largely as the result of the movement of people. Thirdly, at least
some of the people arriving from outside are oﬀering a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge to the widely held assumptions about the place of religion in
European societies. What, though, can be said about the future? Is
Europe likely to produce a religious market like that found in the United
States? The turn from obligation to consumption could be seen in this
light. Conversely are the residues of the state church suﬀiciently strong
to resist this ¢ maintaining thereby the notion of religion as a public
utility rather than a freely chosen voluntary activity? And where in these
complex equations do we place the newly arrived populations, whether
Christian or not? The answers to these questions must be tentative, but I
will oﬀer three.
There are eﬀectively two religious economies in Europe, which run
alongside each other. The ﬁrst is an incipient market, which is emerging
among the churchgoing minorities of most, if not all, European socie-
ties, and in which voluntary membership is becoming the norm, de facto
if not de jure. The second economy resists this tendency and continues to
work on the idea of a public utility, in which membership is ascribed
rather than chosen. In this economy opting out, rather than opting in,
remains the norm and is most visible at the time of a death. Interestingly,
the two economies are in partial tension, but also depend upon each
other ¢ each ﬁlls the gaps exposed by the other. Exploring these tensions
oﬀers a constructive route into the complexities of European religion in
the st century. My sense is that vicarious religion will endure at least
until the mid-century, but not for much longer. It follows that the
actively religious in Europe will increasingly work on a market model,
but the fact that their choices will include the historic churches compli-
cates the issue (the alternatives are not as mutually exclusive as they ﬁrst
appear).
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It is equally clear that religion will continue to penetrate the public
sphere, a tendency driven primarily by the presence of Islam in diﬀerent
parts of Europe. Paradoxically, this is easier to accept for the active,
increasingly voluntarist, Christian minorities to understand than those
who remain passively attached to their (public) historic churches. For
the former, seriously held belief leads to public implications; for the
latter, seriously held belief is seen as a threat rather than an opportunity.
Serious held beliefs, however, can also compete with each other, some-
times aggressively ¢ a rather more worrying outcome. Whatever the case,
it is clear that Islam is a crucial factor that we ignore at our peril. Not
only does it oﬀer an additional religious choice for Europeans, it has
become, simply by its existence, a catalyst of change. Islam must adapt
to Europe (that it clear), but Europe must also adapt to Islam. The
implications of that process are likely to be profound and will, inevitably,
provoke resistance.
Finally, the combination of all these factors will increase rather than
decrease the salience of religion in public, as well as private, debate ¢ a
tendency encouraged by the ever more obvious presence of religion in
the modern world order. In this respect, the world is more likely to
inﬂuence the religious life of Europe than the other way round, even if
the forms of religious life in Europe remain distinct. How then should
the social scientiﬁc community react? One point is clear: religion can no
longer be ignored in scholarly circles; nor ¢ given the implications for
policy ¢ can this be simply a ‘‘scientiﬁc’’ discussion. In short, normative
questions must be central to debates about the place of religion in
European societies, bearing in mind that these are likely to grow rather
than diminish in intensity as the st century unfolds.
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